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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
VIRGIL S. REDMOND, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Case No. 
10,610 
Comes now the Defendant-Appellant, Virgil S. Red-
mond, and petitions the above entitled Court for an order 
permitting a rehearing of Point VII contained in his 
original Appellant's Brief filed herein for the reason that 
the Court erroniously concluded that he failed to request 
that names of additional witnesses be endorsed on the 
information or that he be furnished with their names. 
(See last paragraph of Court's Opinion). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Criminal prosecution for allegedly uttering a fictitious 
check. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Defendant was found guilty by a jury and sentenced 
to a term in the Utah State Prison. 
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DISPOSITION IN SUPREME COURT 
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction in an opin-
ion Filed August 15, 1967. 
RELIEF SOUGHT IN THIS PETITION 
Defendant-Appellant, Virgil S. Redmond, seeks an 
order permitting a rehearing of Point VII contained in 
his Appellants Brief filed herein, and for a new trial 
after argument of said rehearing. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts of the case are fully explained in the Ap-
pellant's Brief filed herein and it is unnecessary to repeat 
those facts here, except to the extent that facts are re-
cited and emphasized in the argument. 
POINT I 
THIS COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT DE-
FENDANT FAILED TO REQUEST THE DISTRICT 
COURT TO REQUIRE THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY TO 
ENDORSE ADDITIONAL NAMES ON THE INFORMA-
TION. 
Defendant incorporates by reference Point VII of 
Appellant's Brief filed herein at pages 20 through 25, 
and the statement of facts found on page 4 of that brief 
pertaining to the failure of the prosecution to furnish 
names of witnesses who were not endorsed on the infor-
mation and his objection to said additional witnesses 
being permitted to testify at the trial. 
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Some additional citations from the record may be of 
assistance to the Court in understanding the efforts made 
by Defendant to obtain the names of witnesses to be 
called by the prosecution at the time of trial, and the 
unfairness suffered by him at his trial as a result of being 
denied the names of those witnesses until they were ac-
tually called at the trial. 
Forty-six ( 46) days before trial Defendant applied to 
the Court for an order limiting the prosecution witnesses 
to those listed on the information, or in the alternative 
requiring the prosecution to furnish the names of addi-
tional witnesses to be called by the prosecution at the 
trial. The District Attorney, Jay Banks, agreed to furnish 
the names of additional witnesses but failed to do so. The 
motion made by counsel for Defendant and the agree-
ment by the District attorney are found at page 607 of 
the record as follows: 
"MR. BARKER: Your Honor, may we have an order 
limiting the witnesses to the ... ones listed on the 
information or in the alternative, requiring them to 
give us the names of all additional witnesses at this 
time." 
"MR. BANKS: We will be glad to supply additional 
witnesses on the Bill of Particulars or as they be-
come known to the State. These were the only ones 
that testified at the Preliminary Hearing. Right now 
I have no personal knowledge of any additional wit-
nesses but we will supply them as they become 
known." (italics supplied) 
The information lists the following four persons as 
witnesses: 
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1. Clara Francis 
2. Denyon Fineschreiber 
3. Carroll Syphys 
4. Jack E. Holstrom 
No additional names were ever endorsed upon the infor-
mation and no additional names were ever furnished to 
Defendant or his counsel. The following fifteen persons 
were called as witnesses at the trial by the prosecution: 
(R. 163-165) 
1. Thomas D. Stoker 
2. Mary Halliday 
3. Laurene F. Shaw 
4. Kurt Madsen 
5. Charles J. Shepherd 
6. Karl Gustaveson 
7. Kenneth Lee McPhail 
8. Bert Wells 
9. George J. Bonebrake 
10. Fred Denman, Jr. 
11. Gary Milo Jenkins 
12. Dave Nicholson 
13. Georgia Rytting 
14. Guy Redmond 
15. N. D. Hayward 
Counsel for Defendant Redmond objected to the prose-
cution calling of any witnesses not listed on the informa-
tion as follows (R. 355-356): 
"MR. BARKER: Thank you. I object to the calling 
of any witnesses whose names were not included on 
the Information or not furnished to the defense on 
the ground and for the reason that at the time of the 
arrainment in this matter request was made to the 
Court for the names or requiring prosecution to 
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furnish names of any other witnesses who were not 
included on the Information and that as I recall the 
Court ordered and the agreement for Mr. Winder at 
arraignment was, the names were to be furnished 
not later than ten days before the trial. No names 
have been furnished and there are certain witnesses 
to which I have been alluded to before the Court and 
when we approached the bench whose names have 
not been furnished. I object to them now being 
called as a denial of our right to be confronted by the 
witnesses against us in sufficient time to interview 
those witnesses and be prepared to meet their testi-
mony and I believe Mr. Winder agrees with that." 
"MR. WINDER: I don't recall ever making that 
agreement and ever being ordered to furnish you 
the names of the witnesses." 
"THE COURT: The motion is denied." 
Mr. Winder did not recall having made the agreement 
to furnish the names of witnesses or the motion referred 
to because Mr. Banks handled the motion and made the 
agreement as indicated on page 3 above, but the 
damage to and unfairness to the Defendant is just as 
real whether the failure to supply names of additional 
witnesses was intentional or the result of lack of com-
munication between the District Attorney and his 
deputies. 
When the prosecution attempted to call witnesses 
whose names had not been endorsed on the information 
Defendant's counsel objected as follows (R. 376): 
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"MR. BARKER: Your Honor, may we have a con-
tinuing objection to the witnesses not listed on the 
Information as I previously indicated." 
"THE COURT: You may." 
Counsel for Defendant repeatedly objected to the call-
ing of witnesses whose names were not endorsed or the 
information or furnished to Defendant by the prosecu-
tion as the District Attorney had expressly agreed to do 
(See page 3 of this brief). (R. 358; 401; 402; 430; 
463; 469. The numerous objections made by counsel for 
Defendant certainly advised the Court of Defendant's 
position and gave the Court ample opportunity to change 
its ruling and to correct its error. 
Counsel for Defandant also moved for a continuance 
to prepare to meet the surprise witnesses in accordance 
with 77-21-52, UCA, 1953 follows (R. 401-402): 
"MR. BARKER: Your Honor, in order to make a 
record of the matter we discussed when we ap-
proached the bench, I move the Court for an order 
prohibiting this witnesses from testifying ... My 
objection is based upon several grounds. Number 
one, his name is not listed on the Information as one 
of the witnesses. We have not been provided with 
his name until now and have had no opportunity to 
prepare to meet this testimony. It takes us by unfair 
surprise. My motion is to continue the matter to give 
us an opportunity to do so because of this unfair 
surprise ... 
"We have been prevented from obtaining this wit-
ness and other witnesses and interviewing them 
prior to the hearing so we could obtain evidence to 
counter this . . . " 
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"THE COURT: The objection is overruled. The 
Court concedes that the issue of discovery is a matter 
of great concern to the defendants and should a con-
viction result, would be certainly a good cause to 
consider the matter on appeal ... The record does 
not disclose any motion for a Bill of Particulars and 
hence the objection to his testifying is denied and 
the claim of surprise is denied ... " 
It is obvious from the foregoing that in making that 
ruling the Court did not recall the agreement to furnish 
names of witnesses made at the motion prior to trial by 
Mr. Banks, yet that agreement was most certainly made 
in open Court by the District Attorney (R. 607 -
Page 3 of this brief) and was relied upon by De-
fendant in preparing for trial. Defendant had no oppor-
tunity to prepare to meet the testimony of 15 of the 19 
witnesses called by the State. Defendant relied upon 
the representation by Mr. Banks that the names of wit-
nesses would be furnished and when none were in fact 
furnished expected to be confronted with only the four 
witnesses listed on the information. This made the pre-
paration of a defense impossible under the circumstances 
and resulted in a denial to Defendant of a fair trial and 
a denial of Due Process. 
The reasons why a Defendant is entitled to know the 
names of prospective witnesses for the prosecution well 
in advance of the trial are discussed in the cases cited 
at pages 21 through 25 of Appellants Brief and will not 
be repeated here. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's Counsel applied for an order requiring 
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the names of witnesses for the prosecution to be endorsed 
on the information or furnished to Defendant's counsel. 
No order was made because of the agreement in open 
court (R. 607) by the District Attorney to furnish names 
of witnesses as they became known to him. No names 
were furnished except the four that were originally 
listed on the information. Defendant was met at the trial 
with fifteen (15) witnesses whose names were not listed 
on the information and were not furnished to Defendant 
until each witness as in turn called to testify. Defendant 
moved for a continuance to give him an opportunity to 
prepare to meet the testimony of those witnesses (R. 401-
402) and repeatedly objected to persons whose names 
were not endorsed or furnished testifying at the trial. 
The Court obviously did not recall Mr. Bank's agreement 
to furnish those names and Mr. Winder who tried the 
case for the State of Utah was not present when Mr. 
Banks made that agreement so the Court concluded that 
no such agreement had been made and denied Defend-
ant's motions and objections. Mr. Redmond relied upon 
that agreement and had no opportunity to prepare to 
defend against the other 15 witnesses whose names were 
not furnished to him. The right to confront one's accusers 
is effectively denied for all practical purposes if the De-
fendant and his counsel do not know the identity of those 
accusers until they are called to the witness stand to 
testify. 
It appears that this Court erred in arriving the con-
clusions reached by it on the last page of its decision to 
the effect that Defendant failed to object and/or to re-
quest the names of additional witnesses. Defendant re-
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spectfully urges the Court to reconsider point VII of his 
original brief filed herein in the light of the additional 
information and citations contained herein which show 
that Defendant did in fact request those names and ob-
ject to the testimony of witnesses whose names had not 
been furnished or endorsed on the Information. 
Done this 31st day of August, 1967. 
RONALD C. BARKER 
2870 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Defendant-
Appellant and Petitioner, 
Virgil S. Redmond 
